Egypt, Ethiopia, Somalia-Somaliland Tensions and the New Trump Administration: A View from Cairo

It's no secret even to the millions who previously paid little attention to global affairs that international borders are under the most severe stress since World War II. Washington's so-called 'Rules Based Order' began to come apart via the NATO aided breakup of Yugoslavia and U.S.-led regime change operations in Iraq and Libya. The overthrow of Gaddafi led to civil war and de facto partition of Libya, also causing significant refugee flows and other issues for a U.S. ally in Egypt. The Libya adventure also emboldened President Obama's CIA into initiating thirteen plus years of Syrian Civil War with first covert support for Syrian rebels during the so-called Arab Spring, then overt NATO (first Turkish, then American) intervention and years-long occupation by Western powers.

See also: The Fall of Assad and the SAR: An Egyptian Perspective

The Strategic Context for Egypt in January 2025

All of these trends culminated in Russia's military intervention of late 2015 that bought Damascus some precious time for diplomacy. Russian bombing also accelerated the defeat of the foreign-sponsored Daesh terrorist movement and the isolation of the jihadist opposition in Turkish-occupied Idlib province, giving Damascus some breathing space. Nonetheless, with barely any light at the end of a dark tunnel from negotiations with and renewed diplomatic recognition by the Gulf Arabs, Assad's government succumbed to a well-executed rebel campaign in late 2024. The point remains that the Assad clan's stunning flight to Moscow was made possible by years of ongoing American, Turkish and Israeli violations of Syrian sovereignty that, together with crushing Western sanctions, impoverished pro-Assad Syrians and demoralized the poorly-paid Syrian Arab Army.

Russia and Iran in turn, have accepted a new Turkish-dominated interim regime in Damascus, while denouncing at the United Nations Israel's expanded occupation of Syrian territory well beyond the previous contact line along the Golan Heights. Despite these indisputable facts, the U.S. and its allies have posed as defenders of national sovereignty at the UN, denouncing Russia's 2014 re-annexation of Crimea and support for pro-Russian secession of the Donbass from Kiev, followed by the Special Military Operation in Ukraine.

Returning to the present, returning President Donald Trump has proposed that Greenland not only declare independence from a US treaty ally in Denmark, but join the United States, along with Canada. Trump also says he intends to use economic measures, possibly severe tariffs on Panamanian goods, to reassert direct American control over the U.S.-constructed Panama Canal Zone. The Zone was handed over to the local Panamanian authorities by the recently deceased President Jimmy Carter, back in 1979—just months after the Carter Administration-brokered Camp David Accords established a decades-long cold peace between Israel and Egypt. So it's fair to say that Egyptian elites are interested in seeing how an incoming Trump team that's bullying longtime NATO allies in Canada and Denmark will treat Cairo.

How Will the New Trump Administration Relate to Egyptian Interests

As they say in the investing world, past performance—despite Trump's first term being very friendly to President Sisi and Egypt's two closest Arab allies Saudi Arabia and the UAE—is no guarantee of future returns. Particularly in case of some superseding U.S. interest in Egypt's immediate neighborhood, say further Israeli belligerence and scurrilous allegations of Egyptian violations of the Sinai demilitarization provisions of the Camp David Accords, were to impact Egyptian-American relations. Another potential issue in our relations with the new Administration: Egypt's complex interests in the Upper Nile and East Africa region potentially finding Cairo at odds with Washington supporting a breakaway, unrecognized since 1991 state of Somaliland, with its capital in Hargeisa.

In 2024, after Cairo and Ankara substantially improved their relations, Somalia signed a strategic cooperation agreement with Egypt and Turkey. This agreement allowed both countries to send military advisors, supplies, and “any other support deemed necessary” by the Somali government. This comes after the African Union peacekeeping mandate in Somalia was about to expire, and plays into a broad strategic chessboard between Egypt, Ethiopia, and Turkey.

The Relationships Between Egypt, Ethiopia and Somalia (Plus Somaliland)

Egypt and Ethiopia have had historical grievances over borders and Nile waters going as far back as the 1800s. As a matter of fact, wars were fought between the two nations in the 19th century. Contemporary geopolitical considerations have simply added another layer of complexity, alongside the construction of the Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam (here after referred to by the unfortunate for digestive disorder sufferers acronym of GERD). The GERD is located just 30 kilometers upstream from Ethiopia's border with Sudan, a country that has suffered its own civil war in recent years. But first, some additional context is necessary to explain the situation.

As many U.S. military veterans and anyone who's watched the Hollywood films Black Hawk Down and Captain Phillips knows, Somalia has not been a stable nation for almost 40 years. Piracy, warlords, militant terrorist movements, and the likes, contribute to the instability of the country. The location of Somalia by the Indian Ocean has threatened international shipping routes through the Bab El Mandab strait, even before the Houthis declared their blockade. Multiple regional and international actors wish to see peace in Somalia, however, in the 21st century, such altruistic goals do not come without national and economic interests being repaid, one way or the other.

Egyptian involvement in Somalia comes from several factors, the fact that Somalia as a Sunni Muslim country is a traditional Egyptian ally, it is an Arab League member, and an important pillar in the strategic depth of our state. Egypt also wishes to improve its standing in Somalia by placing a stronger foundation against prospective investors and regional actors, Qatar and Turkey, and thus, efforts to counterbalance to these two nation states was necessary.

Regarding Ethiopia, the GERD is considered an existential threat to Egypt due to the lack of a permanent and binding concord for coordinating with the Ethiopian side in regards to its operations. The GERD is built over one of the main sources of the Nile River. The Nile provides 90% of the fresh water that comes to Egypt and is a symbol for the Egyptians of their millennia-old civilization that arose on the flood plain of the Nile. Considering historical examples of the usage of water to force droughts or trigger conflict in neighboring nations, Turkey with Iraq and Syria over the Euphrates and Israel with Syria and Jordan for example, this is a serious concern of the Egyptian state. The lack of flexibility offered by the Ethiopian side has convinced Egypt that it's best to invest in an Egyptian military advisor presence in states around Ethiopia for security reasons.

The Sudanese Civil War Drags On, Including as a Proxy if Not Direct Battlefield Between Russia and Ukraine

This all interlinks with the Sudanese Civil War, which is approaching its second anniversary. The Sudanese war which began in early 2023 has complicated regional dynamics and is an additional headache for Cairo, due to Russia supporting both sides, the Ukrainians supported by the CIA and MI6 sending advisors to organize attacks on the Russians, and the UAE and Gen. Khalifa Haftar—leader of an Egyptian-supported government in eastern Libya—backing the Rapid Support Forces. Ethiopia also backs the RSF rebels. All the aforementioned countries have their own agendas, which play into their broader policies across the Horn of Africa.

Neither the Russians Nor the Americans Have Been Able to Persuade the Ethiopians to Moderate Their Position on GERD

With the Sudanese civil war dragging on, Egypt has lost a reliable partner in countering Ethiopia when it comes to the GERD. That said, despite the undeniable impact of the project on their own water supplies, the Sudanese view on GERD was not exactly clear-cut and black and white. But Khartoum generally sided with Cairo, and now with a weakened government of Sudan, the negotiations with Addis Ababa have become much more tense than necessary, and that's saying a lot. The fact that Ethiopia as a historically Orthodox Christian country also maintains friendly ties with Moscow, another Egyptian partner, has not thus far helped to break the deadlock in negotiations.

Egypt's Modernized Navy is Showing the Flag Across the Horn of Africa

The policies of the Egyptian state in Somalia was simply an expected result, for the last ten years Egypt was generally ranked one of the top largest countries in the world in importing arms and equipment, the Egyptian Army has been heavily modernized and the Egyptian Navy has acquired new vessels. These vessels empower Egypt to play a much more direct role in regional affairs, by deploying German submarines and French helicopter carriers. Such modernizations were necessary for Egyptian power projection showing our country's naval flag throughout he Red Sea and the Horn of Africa littoral of the Indian Ocean.

The U.S. is Right to Be Wary of Direct Intervention in East Africa Since 1993

However, as we mentioned before in this article, there are outstanding complications for our country's interests. Because the Horn of Africa has seen an ongoing presence of international superpowers such as the United States and China, which both respectively maintain military bases in Djibouti. France as a traditional colonial power in Africa, despite its eviction from multiple countries across the Sahel, also maintains a base in Djibouti. And the US involvement in Somaliland and the breakaway state's port agreement with otherwise land-locked Ethiopia is something to be wary of. The region also has demonstrated it can rise up against foreign intervention, most notoriously during the 1993 Black Hawk Down incident in Mogadishu, which resulted in dozens of American casualties and multiple UN Pakistani peacekeepers' deaths. Hundreds of Somalis were killed and wounded by American soldiers and gunships in the battle as well.

China’s growing economic and military presence in the Horn of Africa, and the Trump Administration's desire to see the Chinese leave, adds another layer of complexity. For Egypt, aligning with Western and Gulf partners could help counterbalance China’s influence, while also addressing immediate Egyptian security concerns in Somalia.

Ergo, the Horn of Africa is simply another theater of international and regional power play, it may escalate severely and have drastic consequences, but we have yet to see them. Assuming cooler heads prevail, all international powers have a vested interest in preventing further conflicts between nation states breaking out. In the best case scenario for 2025-26, we may see both Russia and the USA mediating between Egypt and Ethiopia to resolve the GERD crisis.

In conclusion, one fact is undeniable, Somalia has asked for the involvement of regional actors and their assets, and the regional actors have obliged, making new moves on a regional chessboard.